Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 5 Issue 5 - October 1969

Article 3

10-1969

Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits Pursuant to Mergers and
Related Transactions
James P. Hemmer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James P. Hemmer, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits Pursuant to Mergers and Related Transactions,
22 Vanderbilt Law Review 1101 (1969)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol22/iss5/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Insider Liability for Short-Swing
Profits Pursuant to Mergers and Related

Transactions
James P. Hemmer*
This article considers the problems presented by the
application of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to corporate merger transactions. Mr. Hemmer argues that the

"matching across" proposal, which has been suggested by some

commentators, should not be applied to the merger situation.

Instead, the author advocates that the "possibility of abuse" test,
which the courts have applied to conversion transactions, should
also. be applicable to the corporate merger. Mr. Hemmer feels this
approach will prevent the abuses for which section 16(b) was
enacted and, at the same time, provide the courts with a flexible
testfor this complex area.
Corporate merger activity presently is at its highest -point in the
history of American business. The number of transactions in 1968
exceeded the previous year's total by approximately 50 percent. For
the members of the corporate bar whose practice is concerned with
insider short-swing transactions, this rise in the number of consolidation
transactions has substantially increased the consternation which that
segment of the bar experiences when assessing the impact of recapture
provisions of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934'
upon the insider's merger exchange of shares.
Traditionally, it has been the rule for practitioners to assume
almost automatically that a merger exchange of shares constitutes a
"sale" of the securities of the non-survivor and a "purchase" of
those of the survivor. This assumption has never been adequately
documented with decisional law, an SEC ruling, or even with law
review commentary. In juxtaposition to the traditional assumption,
the suggestion is becoming popular that it should be possible to follow
the insider's transactions in the "underlying security" so as to match
his pre-merger activities in the shares of the non-survivor with his postmerger speculations in the stock of the survivor.2 Although this so*
I.

Member of the Chicago Bar.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).

2. Even a very superficial glance at the two assumptions here is sufficient to indicate that
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called "matching across" proposal is without foundation in either
decisional law or SEC rulings, the inadequate documentation of the
traditional assumption has not been sufficient to arrest its popularity.
The purpose of this article is to examine and explore the law
developed under section 16(b) and to discuss its applicability to
merger transactions. It is hoped that this analysis will clarify the
confusion generated by the "matching across" proposal and lead to
the adoption of a more flexible approach to these problems.
I.

SECTION

16(b)

OF THE SECURITIES

EXCHANGE ACT AND ITS CASE

LAW

As in the case of most statutes, the crux of the problem rests in
the language of the statute itself. Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act provides that "any profit realized by [the corporate
insider] from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any
equity security of such issuer . . . within any period of less than six
months" is subject to recapture by the corporation On its face, the
language of this statute limits its penalty to transactions where there
has been a short-swing purchase/sale.
The first major case to interpret the statute, Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp.,4 set down rigorous criteria which subsequently have become the
recognized methodology, both for the imposition of section 16(b)
liability and for the computation of the recoverable profit. First,
liability is to be imposed "automatically" or "mechanically"
whenever it is shown that the insider purchased and sold within a
period of six months, irrespective of either the good faith of the
insider or the lack of abuse of inside information with regard to the
short-swing transaction. The point here is that "good faith" is not a
relevant question with respect to section 16(b). The recapture penalty
is to be imposed prophylactically in order to discourage all insider
short-swings. Second, the profit recoverable is to be computed by
means of "an arbitrary matching to achieve the showing of a
maximum profit," even if the insider purchased one certificate and
sold another and can show "that he is holding the purchased security
for sale after six months."
the problem is not simply that of plaintiff's bar versus defendant's bar. While the traditional
assumption provides fewer possibilities for "matching," it does provide for recapture upon the
merger exchange. Accordingly, without a given factual situation, it is almost impossible to
determine which alternative would be most beneficial to either plaintiff or defendant.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
4. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
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The court rejected any identification of certificates actually
purchased and sold for two reasons. First, if the insider conducting
the speculations had a reserve of stock from which to draw upon, an
identification requirement would allow him to circumvent the recapture
penalty entirely, simply by selecting those certificates which he had
held for more than six months as the certificates to be used for the
second step of his short-swing. Second, identification would as a
practical matter prevent the recapture of profits from any sale
followed by a purchase because it would be necessary in such cases to
make the near impossible showing of the insider's subjective intent to
conduct the connected phases of this type of short-swing
Unfortunately, while the two-fold pronouncement of Smolowe
efficiently effectuates the statute when there is an ordinary
purchase/sale situation, problems arise when that two-fold theory is
applied to situafions in which one aspect of the short-swing
transaction is not amenable to the common law definition of the
term "purchase" or "sale." These situations include reclassifications,
conversions, and merger exchanges. The problem is again implicit in
the language of the statute itself. While section 16(b) is limited in its
language to "purchases" and "sales," the definitions of "purchase",
and "sale" ' in the 1934 Act may be construed to include "many types
of transactions not amenable to the common law definitions of those
terms.
The first case to deal with this problem was Park & Tilford, Inc.
v. Schulte,8 which involved a conversion transaction. The issue was
whether a conversion of preferred stock into common was a
"purchase" of the common stock matchable with the insider's sale of
the common. The Second Circuit, applying the rationale of Smolowe,
interpreted the broad definitions of the terms "purchase" and "sale"
to require the application of section 16(b) to any "acquisition of a
security." Judge Clark stated:
We think a conversion of preferred into common stock followed by a sale within
six months is a 'purchase and sale' within the statutory language of section
5. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), reaffirmed Sniolowe's "prophylactic" non-identification rule
despite the fact that it had been established that the actual shares purchased within the sixmonth period in question had not been sold.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1964) provides as follows: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase'
each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire."
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1964) provides as follows: "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
8. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
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16(b). Whatever doubt might otherwise exist as to whether a conversion is a
'purchase' is dispelled by definition of 'purchase' to include 'any contract to
buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.'9

Shortly thereafter, in the first merger case, Blau v. Hodgkinson,'"
a federal district court focused upon the Park & Tilford statement
that section 16(b) is to be applied to each "contractual" disposition
of a security, and held that a merger exchange of shares results in a
"purchase" of the surviving issuer's stock. Today, this holding is still
the only real authority for the proposition that an exchange of stock
pursuant to a merger is cognizable "automatically" for section 16(b)
purposes."
The arbitrariness of the Hodgkinson holding is unfortunate
because, at approximately the same time, the Second Circuit was
beginning to draw away from Park & Tilford's mechanical approach.
In two cases, pro rata transactions were held not to be purchases.'
It was not until the next major conversion case that the Park &
Tilford rationale was directly confronted. In Ferraiolo v. Newman,3
Judge Stewart of.the Sixth Circuit rejected the Park & Tilford
rationale in favor of an approach which compares the facts of each
case against the test of whether "the transaction is of a kind which
can possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by section
16(b)."'' Broadly, Judge Stewart's rationale was that when one
aspect of the short-swing transaction is not amenable to the common
law definition of the term "purchase" or "sale," that aspect will be
considered a "purchase" or "sale" for section 16(b) purposes only if
the transaction possibly could involve the kind of abuse which section
5
16(b) was designed to prevent.
Since Ferraiolo was handed down in 1958, three of the four
circuits which have considered similar situations have adopted its
approach. The Ninth Circuit held a conversion of common stock into
class A stock not to be a "purchase" of the class A stock because it
9.

Id. at 987.

10. 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
II. In Blau. v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 363
F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967), the district court also held, on the
basis of Park & Tilford, that the exchange was a "purchase;" however, the circuit court
explicitly declined to pass upon this issue since it was not contested upon appeal.
12. Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949)
(distribution of warrants on per share basis); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954) (pro rata recapitalization).
13. 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
14. Id. at 345.

15. Id. at 346.
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did not interrupt the continuity of the insider's investment." The
Second Circuit held a conversion of preferred into common not to be,
a "sale" of the preferred because of the economic equivalence of the
preferred and common, the unchanged investment position of the
insider, and the insider's failure to dispose of the underlying security
within six months of its acquisition. 7 The Eighth Circuit held a
conversion not to be a "purchase" when the underlying security had
not been sold within six months of the purchase of the convertible."
The only dissenting circuit, the Third Circuit, handed down an en
banc decision in Heli-Coil v. Webster," which held that when an
insider converted debentures four months after their purchase and sold
the common four months later, the conversion was a sale of the
debentures and a purchase of the common. Four judges dissented, at
least in part, from the majority opinion. Significantly, the majority in
Heli-Coil relied upon the Second Circuit opinion in Park & Tilford.
One year later, in Blau v. Lamb, the Second Circuit implicity rejected
the broad dictum of Park & Tilford and, in a footnote to the opinion,
noted that it was adopting the Ferraiolo approach.20 It pointed out
that its decision was in conformity with the SEC's recently adopted
rule 16b-9,21 which exempts conversions from the operation of section
16(b) if the original acquisition and ultimate disposition are at least
six months apart. Thus, the holding in Heli-Coil is a minority view
based upon a broad dictum which has been disapproved even in its
2
own circuit.
II.

EFFECT OF THE CONVERSION CASES UPON THE APPLICABILITY OF

SECTION

16(b) TO

MERGERS

When applied to mergers, this case development should effect no
greater change than it did with respect to the conversion situations out
16. Blau v. Max Factor& Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965).
17. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
18. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
19. 352 F.2d 156 (3rd Cir. 1965).
20. 363 F.2dat518-19n.15.
21. The SEC rule was itself in response to the muddled Heli-Coil decision, wherein the
SEC had urged-as amicus curiae-the position adopted by the majority.-'the SEC changed its
position on the theory that these transactions "are not comprehended within the purpose of
section 16(b)." 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1968).
22. In this connection, it is interesting to note that a recent district court decision in the
92, 146 (D. Del. (1967)) read the
Third Circuit, Lynanz v. Livingston, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
Heli-Coll decision as limited to voluntary conversion situations and, in effect, declined to follow

its liability rationale.
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of which it arose. In the past, courts have made no distinction in
liability theory between reclassifications, mergers, and conversions.
Accordingly, the current view should be just as relevant to mergers as
it is to the conversion situations out. Therefore, the "actual
possibility of abuse" test should be substituted for Blau v. Hodgkinson's
categorical classification. Under this approach, a merger exchange
will be subject to section 16(b) recognition only if it involves a shortswing speculation presenting an actual possibility of a misuse of inside
information'
The adoption of the "possibility of abuse" test would end the
confusion generated by the arbitrary holding of Heli-Coil v. Webster,
the blanket exemption of conversion exchanges under rule 16b-9, and
the inconsistencies of the Blau v. Lamb decision. Essentially, it is these
trends that have provided the basis for the suggestions that the courts
should accord blanket non-recognition to the merger exchange, should
address themselves to the insider's transactions in the underlying
security, and should match the insider's pre-merger transactions in the
non-survivor's securities with post-merger ones in those of the
24
survivor.
The arbitrariness of the Heli-Coil decision is reflected by the
damages awarded. In order to mitigate the harshness of its
"automatic" imposition of liability upon both the conversion and the
subsequent sale, the Third Circuit refused to uphold the district court
finding that the insider was liable for both the profit upon the
conversion "sale" of the debentures and the sale profit upon final
disposition of the common. Rather it held the insider liable only for
the latter, on the theory that any "profit" which accrued upon
conversion was a "paper profit" held at the risk of the market and
not "profit realized" as required by the language of section 16(b). A
criticism of this point is that section 16(b) liability should not turn
upon the fortuity of whether or not the speculator decides to close out
his speculations. If the exchange is part of a speculative short-swing,
it is the type of transaction section 16(b) is designed to prevent
23. Even before Blau v. Lamb and Peiteys v. Butler, there was some authority for this
type of approach in the merger area. See Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp.
962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (an exchange of assets case which in fact found the insider liable because of
the actual possibility of abuse present in the transaction). See also Newmark v. RKO General
Inc., 294 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
24. See e.g., Lang & Katz, Liabilityfor Short-Swing Trading in CorporateReorganizations,
20 Sw. L.J. 472 (1966); Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under The Securities Exchange A ct, 66
HARV. L. REV. 612 (1953).

25.

352 F.2d at 167-68.
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As noted earlier, 2 rule 16b-9 was adopted to avoid the Heli-Coil
result. Additionally, its exemption of all conversions in which the
original acquisition and ultimate disposition are more than six months
apart was designed to provide an arbitrary rule of thumb reminiscent
of Park & Tilford, in order to avoid the "subjective" standard of
proof required by the "actual possibility of abuse" cases. In practice,
however, the regulation presents more difficulties than are implicit in
Heli-Coil and imposes a more arbitrary standard upon the corporate
insider than would the application of Park & Tilford.
Rule 16b-9 exempts the "acquisition" and "disposition" involved
in the conversion exchange when the insider who is converting does
not have opposite transactions-independent of the conversion
itself-in the convertible security and the underlying conversion
security within six months of the conversion. The anomaly of this
regulation is seen readily in the context of a few of its applications.
For example, if an insider acquired convertible preferred stock and
had no transactions in that preferred or in any other securities of the
issuer for six months, the conversion acquisition/disposition would be
exempt and the insider would not have any matchable transactions if
he subsequently within six months either:
(1)converted the preferred and sold the underlying common, or
(2) sold some convertible preferred, converted the rest, and sold the underlying

common, or
(3) converted the preferred, and purchased some more convertible preferred.

The conversion acquisition and disposition would not be exempt
to the same insider, and he would have matchable transactions if he
either:
(4) converted the preferred, sold the underlying common, and purchased some
more convertible preferred, or
(5) sold some preferred, converted the rest, and purchased some common.

Of course, no one should disagree with the result in (4) above.
There is a short-swing speculation in the preferred-a purchase and a
conversion "sale." But the same is true in (3), and there the
speculation is exempted by rule 16b-9. The only difference is that in
(4) the insider closed out a part of his investment by disposing of the
common, whereas in (3) he did not.
If retention of the investment is a reason for distinguishing
26.

See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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between the speculation in (3) and (4), it is also a reason for totally
denying the exemption to the speculation in the common in (1) and
partially denying it in (2)-both of which rule 16b-9 exempts entirely
despite the short-swing speculation in the underlying common.
The most difficult transaction to understand is (5), which falls
squarely within rule 16b-9(a)(ii) as non-exempt. The transaction
consists of two sales of preferred and two purchases of common. The
only matching possibility is to pair the sales of preferred directly with
the purchases of common. Blau v. Lamb does contain dicta which
support the reverse of this proposition (i.e., purchase of preferred
followed by a sale of common),2 but the Blau v. Lamb dicta are
directed at a situation which is an "in-and-out" speculation. This is
not the case in (5) because the insider has not disposed of his
investment.
This analysis indicates that the regulation does not clarify the
insider trading rules. Its simplistic solution is extremely arbitrary.
While such arbitrariness may be understandable when it takes the
form of an administrative regulation designed to establish clearly
delineated boundaries for one particular type of situation, it is hardly
the type of model which should be employed in fashioning the judicial
guidelines for other situations which involve quite different
considerations.
The Blau v. Lamb decision is even more of a problem. At the
outset of the opinion, the Second Circuit stated that it was adopting
the Ferraiolo "possibility of abuse" approach. The court did not
overrule Park & Tilford, but indicated that the imposition of liability
in that case could be explained by the insider's absolute control.28 This
in effect applies a "possibility of abuse" rationale to the Park &
Tilford fact situation. Subsequently, the court stated:
We think that in cases like the present involving the purchase of a convertible
security and its subsequent conversion, the issue should be whether the underlying
security has been sold within six months from the acquisition of the convertible

security? 9

This statement is in direct contradiction to the court's earlier

adoption of Ferraiolo and is the only judicial pronouncement
providing explicit authority for the "matching across" proposal.
The statement, however, must be read in light of the court's
27.
28.
See note
29.

363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966).
This same sort of application is found in Lynam v. Livingston's reading of Heli-Coil.
22 supra.
363 F.2d at 525.
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refusal to declare its position regarding the "economic equivalence"
theory which is the sine qua non for a finding of non-recognition on a
conversion exchange-a finding basic to the "'matching across"
proposal. Rather, the court proposed three hypothetical situations and
left open the question whether the conversion itself in any of the three
could constitute one part of a speculation subject to section 16(b). 0
One involved a conversion of preferred and a subsequent purchase of
preferred. The question left unresolved was whether this could
constitute speculation in the preferred. The court also left unresolved
the dual question whether a sale of common within six months before
or after a conversion "purchase" of common could in either case
constitute speculation in the common.
The inference to be drawn from these unresolved questions must
be that Blau v. Lamb is not authority for the suggestion that there is
to be blanket non-recognition of conversion (or merger) exchanges.
Further, the court's discussion of the three hypotheticals in terms of a
speculation in a particular security, whether preferred or common,
militates against any implication that it should be possible to match
non-identical securities of even a single issuer. This conclusion is
reinforced by the court's rejection of the claim that "equal
treatment" must be accorded to both aspects of the conversion
exchange.3
Immediately following these statements, however, the court held
that when the original acquisition and ultimate disposition occur
within a period of six months, the entire profit of the insider should
be recaptured on either of two theories:
either on the theory that the accrued profit on the preferred as well as the profit
on the common has been realized, 'within (a) period of less than 6 months' for
purposes of the statute, or else upon the theory that, under such circumstances,
the purchase of a convertible preferred may be treated as a purchase of common
stock, for the statute defines 'purchase' as including 'any contract to buy,
purchase or otherwise acquire,' and the purchase of the convertible security
includes a contractual right to acquire the conversion security. This view of the
statute is reflected in amended rule 16b-9 recently adopted by the Securities &
Exchange Commission . . . 2
30. It is interesting to note that the short-swing speculations in each of these hypotheticals
have been exempted from section 16(b) by Reg. 16b-9 in certain situations.
31. The court stated: -[I]f. . .a conversion followed by a sale of the common facilitates
speculation in the common, this is ...not, standing alone, a reason for concluding that the
conversion should be considered a Section 16(b) 'sale' of the preferred. In order to support this
latter conclusion it must be established that the conversion in some way facilitated short-term
speculative trading in the preferred." 363 F.2d at 524.
32. Id. at 525.
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Of course, this resolution does give effect to the SEC's newly
promulgated rule-a laudable aim. But the language of the second
alternative-the alternative which allows a direct matching of the
purchase of preferred with the sale of common-is the old language of
Park &Tilford,33 of "purchase" and "sale" which arbitrarily applies
the statutory definitions to the recapture scheme of section 16(b).
Both the Ferraiolo decision and the discussion in the Blau v. Lamb
opinion prior to the actual decision recognized the capriciousness
inherent in this application. One year later, however, Petteys v. Butler
followed this same approach immediately after noting that it too was
adopting the Ferraiolo rationale 4
The result is that these cases provide a contradictory rationale.
They pay lip service to the "possibility of abuse" reasoning in
Ferraiolo and to that decision's rejection of the arbitrary "definition"
approach of Park & Tilford, and in the discussions in their opinions
before the actual decisions they do stress the significance of the
"possibility of abuse" test3 At the same time, however, they give
effect to rule 16b-9, a regulation designed to avoid the problems
caused by Heli-Coil's confusion of liability theory and profit recovery
formula. In so doing, they unintentionally provide a methodology that
is more arbitrary than Park &Tilford, one which confuses liability
theory and profit recovery formula at least as much as37 did Heli-Coil, 0
and makes the factual inquiry of Ferraiolosuperfluous.
III.

THE MERGER SHORT-SWING TRANSACTION

This inconsistency in prior authority would not cause any
33. See Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), and text accompanying
note 9 supra.
34. 367 F.2d at 537-38.

35. The statement of the Second Circuit in this regard is unequivocal: "To be sure, the
theory of regulation underlying Section 16(b)'s regulatory mechanism provides a sufficient
reason for refusing to examine the details of transactions once it has been determined that the)
might possibly have served as vehicles for unfair insider trading . . . . [B]ut . . . in order to
avoid 'purposeless harshness' a court should first inquire whether a given transaction could
possibly tend to accomplish the practices Section 16(b) was designed to prevent." 363 F.2d at
519.
36. It is to be recognized that both Blau v. Lamb and Reg. 16b-9 contain an "all or
nothing" profit recovery formula corresponding to their "all or nothing" liability theory. This
profit formula, as well as the liability theory upon which it is based, is not consistent with the
two-fold methodology established by Smolowe. See text accompanying note 4 supra.

37. If there is to be recognition of a conversion exchange when the insider has both a
purchase and sale within six months of the conversion, and non-recognition when the insider
does not, it is difficult to envision any situation not already within the purview of these two
possibilities.
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insurmountable problems if the only situations to which it were
applied were the simple purchase/conversion/sale transactions found
in Lamb and Petteys.3 8 Serious problems arise, however, when this
theory is applied in the merger area to situations analogous to those
in Lamb and Petteys, or to those in which the insider is involved in a
multiple series of transactions within six months involving distinct
securities of different issuers. As an example, take the merger
situation most analogous to Lamb or Petteys-when an insider of the
survivor purchases securities of the non-survivor prior to
announcement of the proposed merger at a price below the merger
exchange value, exchanges the non-survivor's securities for those of
the survivor in the merger, and then has no transactions in the
securities of the survivor for a period of six months. This situation
clearly contains the potential for abuse, and in the recent case of
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 39 which involved similar facts, the
district court found the merger exchange to be a "sale" of the nonsurvivor's securities and imposed liability. Significantly, the defendant's unsuccessful argument centered on the contention that a merger
exchange is tantamount to a conversion of convertible securities and is
therefore exempt from section 16(b).
The defendant's other principal argument in Newmark was that
the survivor's and non-survivor's securities were virtually "economic
equivalents,"-the factor on which most courts have relied in
determining a conversion of convertible securities to be exempt from
section 16(b). The district court rejected this argument, noting that it
is questionable whether an exchange of two different issuers' securities
could ever present the economic equivalence issue. In the case of
convertible securities the insider simply receives a different form of the
same participation in his issuer, but in a merger the insider receives a
different form of a different participation in what is essentially a new
issuer.4 °
It is this factor which makes it impractical to apply in the
merger area an automatic imposition of liability when there is a
purchase and a sale of the underlying security within six months. In
38. In this respect, it is to be recognized that in both Lamb and Pelteys, the invocation of
the SEC's Reg. 16b-9 made the conversion exchanges of the insider-defendants non-recognition
transactions-the same result which ensued from each court's conclusion based upon the
"possibility of abuse" analysis which each had undertaken immediately before their respe tive

"invocations."
39.

I

294 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The defendant insider of the survivor was a It0%

beneficial owner of the non-survivor.
40. Id. at 362-63.
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the case of a merger exchange, there is no "underlying security"
equivalent to the convertible security. The convertible security
contains a contractual right to the conversion security, but the
securities of the non-survivor contain no such right until the merger
agreement has been approved. It is this "contractual right" upon
which some courts have focused in order to justify the automatic
imposition of liability' In the merger area, however, as indicated by
the Newmark v. RKO General, Inc. case, it is before this right comes

into existence that the greatest possibility of abuse is present.
Futhermore, even if the automatic imposition of liability theory were
brought into the merger area without the requirement that there be a
contractual right to the underlying security, because such an
imposition of liability is limited to situations when there has been
both a purchase and a sale of the underlying security within six
months, the insider could speculate with impunity prior to the merger
so long as he did not have any opposite transactions in the survivor's
securities for the six months subsequent to the merger. Viewed in this
light, it is apparent that Blau v. Lamb's underlying security rationale
should be applied only to a simple, single conversion transaction. A
more flexible rule is required when the transaction involves a
complicated merger exchange. It must be recognized that "a merger
or consolidation, perhaps more than any other transaction, involves
many opportunities for abuse of confidential information," 4 and that
almost invariably, the merger exchange itself will have present the
possibility of abuse which requires consideration of the imposition of
liability. At the same time, such a rule would reintroduce the
reasonable limitation of Ferraioloto merger situations and would not
require the imposition of liability upon transactions involving the
purchase and sale of distinct securities of different issuers without
regard to the possibility of any abuse in such situationsA
Further support for the adoption of the "possibility of abuse"
test is provided by the fact that in a merger situation, the insider most
41. See, e.g., Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947); Blau v.
Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
42. Cook & Feldman, supra note 24, at 626.
43. See text accompanying note 35 supra. See also the discussion of Reg. 16b-9 and
particularly example (5) in text accompanying notes 26-27 supra. This result insulates at least
mergers and reclassifications from the "purposeless harshness" to which some conversion situations
are now subject.
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often will not be an insider of both the survivor and the non-survivor.
Of course, the section 16(b) case law does not require that the insider
be such at the time of both the prior purchase and the subsequent
sale. A director has been held liable, even though he became an insiderdirector after he purchased the issuer's stock, on the theory that
section 16(b) is aimed at all "changes of ownership" by the insider
and does not require that he be such at the time of both purchase and
sale.44 The reason it is possible to hold a defendant liable, however, is
because "a purchaser of stock need not have access to inside
information in entering into his initial transaction;" it is the
subsequent speculation after the defendant becomes an insider which is
For the part of the
the " 'vice within the purview of section 16(b)'
short-swing wherein he is an insider, he is speculating in the securities
of the corporation in which he holds a fiduciary position.4
An insider has also been held liable for profits resulting from
sales of his issuer's securities after his association with the issuer had
ceased.47 The insider's liability in this case, however, was expressly
limited to the profits resulting from sales of securities that were
purchased when he was associated with the issuer and sold shortly
after the relationship ceased. The court's theory was that both the
purchase and the sale could have been unfairly motivated by the
insider's special knowledge of the issuer.
So viewed, these propositions add nothing which would support
the matching-across theory and, in fact, support the "abuse of insider
position" rationale found in Ferraiolo. Where an insider of the nonsurvivor only conducts pre-merger transactions in his issuer's
securities, he is speculating in those securities. Post-merger
transactions in the securities of the survivor are irrelevant vis-a-vis his
former position as an insider with special knowledge of the affairs of
the non-survivor. Similarly, where an insider of the survivor only
conducts pre-merger transactions in the non-survivor's securities, he is
speculating in securities of a corporation wherein he is not a section
8
16(b) insider
".!5

44. Adler v. Klawans, 267 IP.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp.
702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 831 (1956); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (defendant was an insider of survivor and non-survivor).
45. Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y 1958).
46. Accord, Lee National Corp. v. Segur, 281 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (the court
held that an officer of a subsidiary of the issuer is not an insider within the purview of§ 16(b)).
47. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969).
48. Whether the atmosphere is a "disclosed" or an "undisclosed" one is irrelevant here
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It should be recognized that limiting section 16(b) to transactions
in securities of an issuer in which the defendant is an insider does not
mean that recapture will be impossible against the insider of the
survivor who engages in pre-merger transactions in the shares of the
non-survivor. Section 16(b) is not a panacea for all insider abuse; the
insider must also reckon with section 10(b).11 While there is no
reported decision precisely in point, the SEC has attempted to obtain
restitution from insiders to shareholders who sold their stock to the
insiders immediately before a merger. 0 In SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur,5' the district court rejected the defendants' argument that
section 16(b) limits the liability of directors and insiders to the terms
of that provision. To the contrary,
trading by an insider on the basis of material undisclosed information constitutes
a deceptive
practice in violation of the statute [Section 10(b)] and rule [Rule
2

lOb-5]

Although these statements were made with reference to insider
purchases, they should be applicable in the same manner to insider
sales. While under rule lOb-5, as opposed to section 16(b), the
additional showing of an intent to use undisclosed inside information
to speculative advantage is required, 53 this would afford slight
consolation to the insider who trades before the announcement of the
merger.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The suggestion that it is possible to match across a merger has no
foundation in any authority-either case law or SEC regulation-and
there is no analogous authority suggesting that "matching across" will
soon become a part of the law.54 At the same time it must be recognized
since the possibility of abuse is not foreclosed in either case. See Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v.
Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
49. See Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and
Disclosure Obligations Under Rule lob-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 809 (1968), as a current example of
the consideration of the ramifications of section 10(b) for their applicability to the merger
situation.
50. SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 246 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
51. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied on
appeals of defendants Coates and Kline, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (Nos. 897 & 937).
52. 258 F. Supp. at 262.
53. In light of the recent opinion of the Second Circuit in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation,
it is unclear whether the "intent" requirement consists of anything more than lack of diligence,
constructive fraud, or even mere negligent conduct. 401 F.2d at 855.
54. While SEC Reg. 16b-9 would provide the SEC with a ready-made framework within
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that while the judicial trend has been away from strict objectivity in the
imposition of liability, this trend most often will be of no value in the
merger situation. Merger exchanges, perhaps more than any other
transactions, are fraught with the possibility of insider abuse. Ferraiolo
presents a liability theory designed for the task of assessing the meaningfulness of imposing liability in these situations, and once assessed,
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp. provides a profit recovery formula capable
of effectuating the statutory scheme in both single and multiple transaction situations.
which to draft a merger regulation which has a broader application than Reg. 16b-7, there is no
assurance that the regulation would be accepted by the courts. Reg. 16b-9 is extremely arbitrary
in certain situations and, in concept, is contrary to the "possibility of abuse" rationale
developed by the courts. In this light, it is worth noting that other SEC regulations have been
held invalid on the ground that the SEC had no authority to adopt them. Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969); B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d
Cir. 1964); Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957): Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F Supp.
246 (S.D.N-Y. 1959).

